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Introduction 
Regulatory approaches to ensure food safety are challenged by the changes in the supply chain, 
rapidly advancing food technologies (Pritchard and Walker, 1998; Schofield and Shaol, 2000) 
and complexities of the institutional environments (Goldsmith, Turan and Gow, 2003; Roosen, 
Lusk and Fox, 2003; Goldsmith, Gow and Turan; 2003). Consumers do not have adequate 
information on the safety attributes of the food products that they purchase and concurrently food 
firms do not have direct incentives to reveal this information (Crutcfield et al., 1997; Segerson, 
1999; Caswell, 2000; Böcker, 2002; Goldsmith, Gow and Turan, 2003; Ollinger and Ballenger, 
2003; Ollinger and Mueller, 2003; Elbasha and Riggs, 2003; Christensen et al., 2003; Kola and 
Latvala, 2003). Moreover “without the ability to fully capture returns to costly control of product 
hazard, firms lack the incentive to implement controls for food safety” (Unnevehr and Jensen, 
1999; p.626).   
The market for safety attributes of food products is not fully developed (Caswell, 2000) 
and information asymmetries and incentive problems pose systemic risks in the food sector 
(Hennessy, Roosen and Jensen; 2003) where sub-optimal outcomes may occur. Some argue with 
this market failure at hand government intervention is justified in order to enhance social welfare 
(Elbasha and Riggs, 2003; Roosen, Lusk and Fox, 2003; Kola and Latvala, 2003; Unnevehr and 
Jensen, 1999; Segerson, 1999). Yet government’s task is not simple. There are various policy 
options and alternative mechanisms, both public and private, available beyond traditional 
regulation to incentivize food firms to actively engage in food safety. Evaluating and comparing 
these alternative approaches would involve risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis (Henson 
and Heasman, 1998; Jouve, 1998; Caswell, 2000; Hobbs, Fearne and Spriggs, 2002). The 
overarching policy question is how to achieve a safe food supply given both the availability of Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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alternative regulatory, institutional, and market-based strategies and the complexities of 
operating within a global business environment.   
At the heart of this policy question is understanding the fundamental relationship between 
government (society) and the firm where the market for food safety is of concern.  How does 
society elicit the level of safety it wants?  Food firms do have incentives to deliver some safety 
along with their food products.  Some firms have incentives to supply more safety than others.  
The departure in terms of the safety that any one firm bundles with its products is a function of 
the private-public goods nature of the safety.  Supplying safety is costly. For example, greater 
levels of safety may need to be bundled with certain food products because of the significant 
investment, ex-ante, in a national brand and the extent of a financial loss if a breach were to 
occur (Sporleder and Goldsmith, 2001).  In such a case much of the value of safety is a private 
good whose rents are internalized.  Other firms may not have such private incentives and thus 
may deliver lesser levels of safety.  And discussed in conclusion, there may be instances where 
firms are forced to deliver too much safety.   
Correspondingly, there is a demand for safety.  As discussed below, the assumption of a 
downward sloping demand curve for safety is not unrealistic.  In such a case the marginal value 
for each unit of safety declines in quantity. Conceptually then, the problem can be modeled as a 
market efficiency question.   What is the correct amount of safety?  And how does government 
(society) elicit the proper amount of safety if private incentives are inadequate?     
To better understand the underlying economics of the market for safety this research 
formalizes the analysis using agency theory.  The framework of the model is the complex power 
relationship between the regulator and the firm and the efficient delivery of safety.   
The salient features of this model are:                                                                                         Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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•  The risk preferences of the agent; 
•  The mapping between effort and safety and the stochastic properties of food 
safety breaches; 
•  The quantity/quality of information and modern immeasurability issues.  
The base case depicts the government as the risk neutral principal who needs to induce a 
risk averse agent, the food firm, to engage in active pursuit of food safety. After the base-case we 
then turn to the salient features and examine how they impact the delivery of safety.  Finally the 
paper applies the model to analyze recent developments in the U.S. meat industry. 
 
The Model:  Food Safety Problem in a Principal-Agent Setting 
The Base Case Scenario 
 
In this model the government as the regulator wishes to achieve food safety for the public and 
the regulated firm produces both food and safety.  The two are engaged in an agency 
relationship. The government can face certain informational, transactional, administrative and 
political constraints (Laffont, 1994), which create obstacles in the process of implementing 
preferred policies (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). This generates a moral hazard problem since 
delegation of a task, in this case providing safe food, is costly and involves information 
asymmetry between the principal and the agent (Laffont and Martimort 2002; Elbasha and Riggs, 
2003). The answer to the moral hazard problem is rooted in the use of incentives (Kreps, 1990; 
Vetter and Karantininis, 2002). As the principal, government can “incentivize” the agent 
(Laffont and Martimort, 2002) via use of penalties or compensation schemes.  
In order to ensure that the food firm is taking proper actions to provide safe food to the 
public and choosing the optimal level of effort (e
*), assume the government uses a compensation Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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scheme, CR (.). The compensation that the firm receives is not monetary but rather denominated 
in terms of “days of operation.”  The government will let the firm operate; in other words give 
days of operation as compensatory payment to the firm and send its inspectors to the plant as 
long as the firm complies with the regulations. If there is a violation then the firm will face the 
threat of government removing its inspectors. Without the necessary government “stamp,” the 
firm’s products would be virtually be unmarketable creating extreme financial distress and likely 
bankruptcy.
3 Furthermore in case of violations, the firm could face penalties in form of 
additional fees and further legal (civil or criminal) action.  During the time that the firm stays in 
operation, the government continually sends its inspectors ensuring the plant is in compliance. 
Therefore CR (.) represents the regulatory costs to the government. 
The government is a risk neutral regulator.  The utility function of the principal is 
denoted as Up (.), with U'p>0 and U''p=0. On the other hand the risk averse agent has the utility 
function  Ua  (.), which is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave. 
Accordingly this is denoted as:  U'a (.) >0, Ua (.)''≤0.  
The agent prefers to exert less effort to more effort and the cost of effort to the agent C(e) 
is strictly increasing and convex with C'(e)>0, C''(e)>0 and C (0)=0. The compensation payment 
to the agent, CR (.) depends on a generalized food safety measure denoted by S (see Goldsmith 
and Basak, 2001). This measure can be used to represent various safety indicators such as 
Deaths   of Number 
1
or
Illnesses   of Number 
1
, some performance indicator of the firm’s Hazard 
Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) program in use, or a consumer faith measure. 
The principal’s problem is to maximize Up  (.) subject to the participation and the 
incentive constraints of the agent: 
                                                 
3 See the case of Supreme Beef available at Lexis-Nexis 26205.  Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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Max
e   CR(S),
f(S;e)dS (S-CR(S))  Up ∫   (1)   
 st.  (i)  o a U C(e S;e)dS (CR(S)) f( U ≥ − ∫ )              
      (ii) e
* solves Max
e   ) (e C S;e)dS (CR(S)) f( Ua − ∫             
 
  The agent must receive at least its reservation utility Uo, in other words its next best 
opportunity,  in order to accept the contract offered by the principal. This is shown by the 
participation constraint (i).  The incentive compatibility constraint (ii) insures that under the 
compensation plan CR(S) the agent’s optimal choice of effort is e
* (Mas-Colell, Whinston and 
Green,1995). It is possible to write this constraint using the first order approach, with the 
assumption that the expected utility of the agent is concave in effort (Jewitt, 1988). Then the first 
order incentive compatibility constraint becomes: 
  (iii)  ) (e C (S;e)dS (CR(S)) f U e a ′ = ∫   
The food safety measure shown as S  is stochastically related to the effort level of the 
agent by the probability density function f(S;e).   e f (.) is the partial derivative with respect to 
effort.  The Lagrangian of this problem can be written as: 
)) ( ) ; ( )) ( ( ( )) ( ) ; ( )) ( ( ( ) ; ( )) ( ( L e C e s f S CR U e C e s f S CR U e s f S CR S U e a a p ′ − + − + − = β α  
After solving the principal’s problem with respect to the compensation payment scheme  ) (S CR  
and rearranging the Kuhn-Tucker Conditions the “second-best”
4 risk-sharing rule (Holmström, 
1979)
5 is: 

















β α  (2)   
Furthermore with optimization of (1) with respect to e we get: 
                                                 
4 If the principal had full information, in other words if the effort were fully observable then there would not be a 
moral hazard problem and the solution to the principal’s problem could be characterized as the “first-best”, with β 
=0 since the incentive compatibility constraint becomes irrelevant. 
5 See Sherstyuk  (2000); Goldsmith and Basak (2001); Laffont and Martimort (2002). Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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( ) ) ( ) ; ( )) ( ( ) ; ( )) ( ( e C dS e S f S CR U dS e S f S CR S U e a e p ′ − = − ∫ ∫ β  (3) 
The safety measure S affects the principal’s utility in two ways: 
•  Since the regulator prefers higher levels of food safety to lower levels of food 
safety, as S  increases the utility of the principal directly increases. 
•  The compensation payments to the firm  ) (S CR   increase as S  takes higher 





 is the likelihood ratio, which is monotone and non-decreasing in S. It calculates 
the ratio of the likelihood of observing a particular food safety indicator level S
~
when the agent 
chooses to exert the optimal effort level e
*, to the likelihood of achievingS
~
 in the case that the 
agent has chosen to exert some other sub-optimal level of effort (Varian, 1992). The likelihood 
ratio therefore demonstrates the strength of the relationship between the agent’s effort level e and 
the safety indicatorS .  In application this ratio describes the dual relationship between firm level 
safety efforts and society’s perspective of the safety produced.  So a firm may give high effort 
but have little impact on the likelihood of a breach.  Or, where societal perceptions are involved, 
a firm may give high effort and society may perceive safety is enhanced because a breach has not 
occurred.  The converse with respect to low effort holds as well. 
α and β are the multipliers of the participation and the first order incentive compatibility 
constraints respectively. In other words these parameters represent the principal’s shadow prices 
for the two constraints (i) and (iii). Higher α values are associated with higher reservation 
utilities of the agent whereas higher β values represent severe information problems due to 
government’s inability to observe the firm’s effort level (Ligon, 2001).  
 Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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Three Salient Features of the Model 
Risk Preferences of the Agent 
Lundesgaard (2001) and Laffont and Martimort (2002) point out that with the risk averse agent, 
the principal faces the “insurance-efficiency trade-off.” With a risk averse agent, efficiency 
requires some sharing of the risk between the principal and the agent (Sappington, 1991). Paying 
a fixed amount fully insures the risk averse agent however when the principal is not able to 
directly observe the agent’s effort level, the principal needs to include in the payment schedule a 
motivational amount contingent on the effort level so that the agent applies high levels of effort 
(Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995). This means that there exists a welfare loss associated 
with the unobservability since some of the efficiency has to be given up to induce the agent exert 
high level of effort (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995; Kreps, 1990).  
In the conventional principal-agent model with non-observable agent effort, if the agent 
were risk neutral then the socially optimal outcome would be achieved.  The agent chooses the 
same level of effort as in the case of the first best situation, where the effort is observable (Kreps, 
1990; Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995; Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Kreps (1990, 
p.593) explains the intuition behind this favorable outcome from the general case of a principal-
agent model: 
If the agent is risk neutral, efficient risk sharing between the principal and agent is 
consistent with the agent bearing all the risk. And by having the agent bear all the 
risk, we have him bearing entirely the consequences of his action choice. It is as if 
the principal “sold the venture” to the agent, who is now sole proprietor and is 
working for himself, and who now chooses the optimal action in his own sole and 
best interests. 
 
In the case of a risk neutral agent moral hazard does not impose transaction costs that 
cause inefficiencies since the principal has the ability to achieve the first-best utility level as in 
the case where the principal can directly control the agent’s effort, (Laffont and Martimort, Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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2002). When the agent is risk neutral, the optimal risk sharing is determined with the first-best 
rule and consequently the agent can be offered a fixed compensatory payment. 
At an initial level of analysis this would imply that the government would prefer, or food 
safety would be optimized, if the government dealt with a risk neutral firm as opposed to one that 
was risk averse.  With such a contract, the risk neutral firm would be willing to bear all the risks 
associated with establishing a safe food system and making the key investments in order to 
comply with the standards. Therefore remaining consistent with the conventional theory the firm 
would choose to apply the socially optimal level of effort.   
Correspondingly with a risk averse agent, the government would need to engage in risk 
sharing associated with the food safety investments so that the agent accepts the contract offered 
and participates in providing safe food to the public.  Without risk sharing the risks of investing 
in the delivery of safety would be too great forcing non-participation by the agent. The 
government left with non-participation might think about full insurance to induce participation.  
However this is not plausible since the principal needs to also induce high level of effort with 
less than full information. 
In this model the risk to the firm (agent) stems from investing in food safety. Whether 
driven by compliance with government regulations and/or responding to market incentives, food 
safety risk mitigation strategies can impose sizeable costs
i on firms (Antle, 1999; Loader and 
Hobbs, 1999; Caswell, 2000; Siebert, Nayga Jr., and Hooker, 2000; Ollinger and Mueller, 2003). 
The assumption is that these costs are associated with the public goods aspects of food 
production and thus the benefits can not be internalized, and therefore the costs are burdensome.   
Two key questions emerge with respect to the first salient feature, agent risk preferences:  
•  What are the risk preferences of the U.S. food firms? Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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•  How does risk affect the efficient delivery of optimal levels of food safety by the firm?  
The formal model will be used later to explore these questions with respect to the U.S. meat 
industry.   
Mapping between Effort and Safety: the Likelihood Ratio 
Assessing whether a firm is putting forth maximal effort is a significant element of the 
information asymmetry found in principal-agent relationships.  High effort may be given with 
little to show the principal, or the stochastic properties of breach may be such that low levels of 
effort appear to the principal to result in positive outcomes.  This is especially significant within 
the context of food safety.  For example in the case of Supreme beef (see Lexis-Nexis 26205) a 
critical issue was the regulatory and legal implication of a (repeated) failed pathogen test(s).  Did 
failure serve as a valid assessment of the firm’s HACCP program and therefore serve as signal 
that the firm was out of regulatory compliance?   The mapping between effort and safety is also 
of interest for firms utilizing a quasi-due diligence defense for safety breaches resulting in civil 
or criminal actions.   
This relationship between effort and safety is captured by the likelihood ratio.  The higher 
this ratio, the stronger is the relationship between e and S.  The second best solution where the 
principal needs to compensate the agent to elicit optimal effort is vastly dependent on the 
distribution of S and the functional relationship between S and e determined by f (.). 
Consequently the higher the likelihood ratio the more willing is the government to pay higher for 
higher levels of effort (Goldsmith and Basak, 2001).  
Goldsmith and Basak (2001) indicate, if in the limit, the sub-optimal level of effort has a 
very small effect on achieving a given level of S, say S
~
, the denominator of the likelihood ratio 
will approach zero and the likelihood ratio can take the maximum value of ∞. Accordingly in the Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
  10
case of optimal level of effort e
* leading to a high probability of obtainingS
~
, the principal will 
be willing to increase the compensatory payment above the fixed portion and pay an additional 
motivational amount (premium). This is due to the fact that under these conditions the principal 
has a greater ability to influence S via the compensatory payment.  Therefore when the 
relationship between S and e appears to be strong, indicated by a high likelihood ratio, the 
principal pays the agent the fixed amount plus a motivational amount (Goldsmith and Basak, 
1999). On the other hand if S is not at all a function of the agent’s effort then the optimal 
compensatory payment will consist of only the fixed payment (Holmström, 1979; Goldsmith and 
Basak, 2001; Laffont and Martimort, 2002).  
Quantity/Quality of Information and Immeasurability Issues 
If the principal has full information about the effort level the agent chooses to exert, then a moral 
hazard problem does not exist. With fully observable effort, the incentive compatibility issue 
would be resolved and the optimal contract from this “First-Best” solution would be to pay the 
agent a fixed amount (Holmström, 1979; Kreps, 1990). 
Operating with full information is an unlikely case because of various monitoring and 
information costs in food safety.  The post-modern agri-food system contains additional factors 
that contribute to the measurability problems such as dynamic process innovation and advances 
in biotechnology (Crutcfield et al., 1997; Fearne, 1999; Caswell, 2000; Sporleder and Goldsmith, 
2001; Cho and Hooker, 2002; Ollinger and Mueller, 2003; Elbasha and Riggs, 2003; Hennessy, 
Roosen and Jensen, 2003; Roosen, Lusk and Fox, 2003). The high speed and internal nature of 
current innovation creates significant challenges keeping regulatory metrics up to date and well-
placed.  Many impacts of agricultural biotechnology are unknown at the present time because; 
the technology is so novel, there are intergenerational uncertainties, and isolating individual Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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effects from system effects is difficult.  Additionally, Christensen et al. (2003) and McCluskey 
(2000) mention that information provided by the firms regarding the food safety attributes might 
in fact be inaccurate and misleading because of economic incentives that spring from profit 
maximizing behavior.   
Therefore the principal’s (government) ability to measure is challenged by both 
quantitative and qualitative issues associated with food safety information.  This dynamic and 
novel context, where incentives for full disclosure do not exist, creates significant levels and 
types of information asymmetry.  The principal is then challenged not only by the measurability 
problem, but also at a practical level determining whether or not the firm has exerted socially 
optimal level of effort to provide the socially optimal level of safety to the public.  
 
System Failure and the Weibull Distribution 
In order to explore these three salient features a model that specifies f(s; e), Up and Ua is used.   
Let the utility functions of the risk neutral regulator and the risk averse firm be  
Up= S-CR (S) and Ua=2 ) (S CR  respectively.  The stochastic relationship between the effort 
and safety is characterized by the Weibull Distribution, with the probability density function 




















e S f exp ) ; (
1
 where e is the scale parameter and  γ  is the shape parameter (or 
slope). Three general cases, γ =1, γ >1 and γ <1 can be analyzed.  These values represent constant, 
increasing and decreasing failure rates respectively.  
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Constant Failure Rate: γ =1 
When  γ =1, the Weibull probability density function is the same as an exponential pdf.  This 
traditional approach has the properties of analytical tractability and the system under study would 
have a constant failure rate (see Holmström, 1979; Laffont and Martimort, 2002).  The time interval 
between failures of the system in place is a random variable that is exponentially distributed. The 
firm’s effort determines the expected time before there is a (safety) failure and the safety indicator 
S is proportional to the length of time that the firm operates without a failure of this kind 
(Holmström, 1979)





− − −   




















         ( 4 )  
where F denotes the cumulative density function (cdf). Therefore for γ =1, the exponential 
distribution case, the failure rate function, in failures per unit of measurement (failures per week, 




The exponential distribution possesses a “Memoryless Property.”   The fact that a safety 
failure has not occurred says nothing about the length of time before the next breach.  In terms of 
food safety, the time length for the second food safety breach does not depend on the length of time 
for the first. Consequently the statistical characteristics of the second arrival will not be influenced 
by the length of time for the first occurrence of the food safety breach in the system
7.  Thus γ =1 has 
a property of randomness with respect to system failure.  The failures originate due to factors outside 
the system and are unknown, not from components inherent to the system (i.e. effort (e)). 
                                                 
6 The proportionality factor=1.  
7 See http://www.weibull.com/AccelTestWeb/acceltestweb.htm Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
  13
  The likelihood ratio for γ =1 becomes: 
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this determines the optimal compensatory payment schedule:  
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S CR β α  (7) 
         This example demonstrates the key role of  ) ; ( e s f and the likelihood ratio in determining 
the second best risk sharing arrangement and consequently the compensatory payment.  As noted 
previously, if the effort is fully observable or if the likelihood ratio is zero then the regulator 
offers the firm a fixed (first best) compensatory payment schedule CR
fb=
2 α . Without full 




























e s f e e β αβ that reflects the willingness to pay more for higher 
levels of the likelihood ratio, when the principal cannot fully observe the effort. Therefore from 
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Parameterizing the Weibull then with γ  = 1 seems unrealistic.  The assumption of a 
constant failure rate provides mathematical models that can be easily implemented and 
explained, yet leads us away from the benefits that can be gained from adopting models that 
more accurately represent real world conditions (ReliaSoft, 2001). For example, such a depiction Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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may not be appropriate for the context of food firms where failure may in fact be a function of 
effort; certainly a supposition behind the USDA’s HACCP policy. Therefore we will focus on 
the increasing and decreasing failure rate cases to analyze the contract space, and the relationship 
between the payment schedule and effort. 
Increasing Failure Rate:γ >1 
Alternatively, when γ >1, the food safety system operates with an increasing failure rate which 
means system wears out and probability of a breach increases with time. This formulation 
captures the notion of system fatigue
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the likelihood ratio is: 
) ( 5 ) 1 ( 5




and the payment schedule is: 
{} []    ) ( 5 ) (
2 1 6 5 − − − + = e e S S CR β α      (12) 
In order to incentivize the agent to exert higher levels of effort, the principal pays 
increasing amounts for each marginal unit of effort (Equation 13). Society’s demand for safety is 
assumed to be downward sloping indicating negative marginal benefits from food safety. 
Therefore the optimal payment schedule consistent with these preferences increases at a 
decreasing rate (Equation 14). 
[] [ ] {} 0 5 ) 30 35 ( 6 1
) ( 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 2 ≥ − − + − =
∂
∂ − − − − − e S e S e e S e
e
S CR
β α β    (13) Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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[] [ ] {} 0 15 ) 280 390 ( 2 42
) ( 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 3
2
2
≤ + − + − =
∂
∂ − − − − − e S e S e e S e
e
S CR
β α β    (14) 
System fatigue (gamma >1) may swamp the effect of increasing effort and underlie a 
weak likelihood relationship.  Under such conditions with either fixed or human asset fatigue 
principals may find it necessary to redirect a firm’s effort and rebuild the system.  This “pump 
priming” strategy can occur by channeling investments to different food safety protocols, re-
training employees, or bringing in new technology.  Redirection and rebuilding may then help 
avoid the asymptotic problem of increasing effort, flat payment schedules, and little impact on 
safety.   
Decreasing Failure Rate: γ <1 
In this case food safety system operates with a decreasing failure rate where  γ <1.  Decreasing 
failure rate is systems occur when there is learning by doing. It certainly can be imagined that a 
food company that engages in new programs, protocols, and investments in food safety would 
find decreasing failure rates over a relevant range.  (Then system fatigue may arise switching the 
appropriate gamma parameter to greater than 1.)  
Assume γ =0.5.  For this particular level of gamma the Weibull pdf is: 
5 . 0 5 . 0
exp 5 . 0 ) ; (
5 . 0 5 . 0
− − − − =
e S S e e S f    (15) 
Using equation (4) the failure rate is 












S φ     (16)                              
 Then the likelihood ratio becomes: 
) 1 ( 5 . 0
) ; (
) ; ( 5 . 0 5 . 0 1 − =
− − e S e
e S f
e S fe
  (17)                              
and through the risk-sharing rule, the compensatory payment schedule is: 
                            (18)  {} []   5 . 0 5 . 0 ) (
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Similar to the γ >1 case the effort-payment relationship is concave (Equation 19), 
increasing at a decreasing rate (Equation 20), and asymptotic reflecting the decreasing marginal 
value of effort on the delivery of safety.   
[] [ ] {} 0 5 . 0 ) 75 . 0 25 . 1 ( 5 . 1 5 . 0
) ( 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 1 5 . 0 5 . 0 2 ≥ − − + − =
∂
∂ − − − − − e S e S e e S e
e
S CR
β α β     (19) 
[] [ ] {} 0 5 . 1 ) 375 . 4 3 ( 1 75 . 3
) ( 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 1 5 . 0 5 . 0 3
2
2
≤ + − + − =
∂
∂ − − − − − e S e S e e S e
e
S CR
β α β        (20) 
This is consistent with an assumption that the indifference curves that represent the 
preferences of the society/government for safety are convex and therefore the demand for safety 
is downward sloping.   So for the principal, the last unit of safety is less valuable than the first 
unit. 
 
Operationalizing the Model 
The objective of this section is to integrate the three salient features with the various distribution 
parameterizations (gamma values) in order to analyze the construction of an optimal contract 
between the principal and the agent (Figure 2).  Since the constant failure rate case (γ =1) 
involves applicability problems to the real world, only increasing failure rate (γ >1) and 
decreasing failure rate (γ <1) cases will be considered. 
Risk Preferences of the Agent 
Risk preferences of the agent changes the problem considerably for the government as a 
regulator. As in the full information case with a risk neutral agent (even with less than full 
information), the theory suggests that the incentive compatibility is automatically resolved and Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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the first best outcome will be achieved through a fixed payment to the agent
8. On the other hand 
with a risk adverse agent the government’s task gets more complicated due to the incentive-
insurance trade off that emerges in an environment of information asymmetry and moral hazard 
(Bontems and Thomas, 2003).  
Mapping between Effort and Safety: the Likelihood Ratio 
Effort-Safety mapping, linked to the likelihood ratio fe/f, determines whether the payment 
schedule will include a motivational amount that rewards (punishes) high levels (low levels) of 
effort or not. If the safety outcome is considered to be unrelated to agent choosing high levels of 
effort (in other words if obtaining the desired level of safety is coincidental) the likelihood ratio 
approaches to zero. As the possibility of achieving the socially optimal outcome with a sub-
optimal level of effort is high compared to obtaining the same result with the high (optimal) level 
of effort, then the payment schedule excludes the motivational amount
9.  
Quantity/Quality of Information and Immeasurability Issues 
Different levels of β represent various degrees of information asymmetry between the 
government and the food firm regarding the effort level. Higher levels of β represent more severe 
information problems and also increasing regulatory costs to the government. In order to 
demonstrate the effect of beta on the compensatory payment schedule, Figure 1 depicts the case 
of three different beta values: high, low and zero. β=0 corresponds to the full information state 
where the incentive compatibility constraint becomes irrelevant and the government as the 
principal offers a fixed payment to the firm.  
 
                                                 
8 The validity of this assumption in real world and the implications regarding all the three salient features will be 
explored in the next section through a study of the US meat sector. 
9 See the argument by the Supreme Beef related to the effort-safety mapping in the next section on the meat sector.  Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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Figure 1. Effect of Information Problems on the Payment Schedule 




























Integrating the three salient features and the underlying failure structure creates a finite 
contract space (Figure 2).  Sixteen different scenarios can be analyzed and, depending on the 
parameterization, contract performance differences can between evaluated.   The ability to 
generate an efficient contract eliciting the correct amount of safety would then depend on the 
salient features of the cell in question.  As a preliminary exercise of the model we analyze the 
U.S. meat industry to better understand the quality of the principal-agent relationship between 
the government and industry. 
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Figure 2. Food Safety Contract Space: Salient Features, Failure Rates and Optimal 
Contracting 
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Applications of the model to the U.S. Meat Industry 
Pathogen related foodborne illnesses have been a continuous problem in the U.S. meat industry 
for more than a decade (Ollinger and Mueller, 2003; Christensen et al., 2003; Tauxe, 2002; 
Tucker Foreman, 2002; Crutchfield and Roberts, 2000; Crutcfield, 1999). Foodborne pathogens 
are estimated to result in 76 million illnesses and 5000 deaths in the United States each year 
(Mead et al., 1999). Foodborne illnesses outpace product liability cases from any other sector 
(Buzby, Frenzen and Rasco, 2001).  Yet meat consumption continues to rise, consumer outcry is 
muted, and industry seems little affected (Goldsmith et al. 2002).  
Considering the shift to larger firms and market concentration (Macdonald et al., 1996; 
Ollinger et al., 1997; Macdonald et al., 2000; Morrison Paul, 2001) U.S. meat industry firms then Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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would be expected to be risk neutral agents. Hence it is normally anticipated that these larger 
firms as risk neutral agents would engage in proactive food safety activities and their rate of 
compliance would be much higher compared to the smaller ones (Caswell, 2000; Holleran, 
Bredahl and Zaibet, 1999; Loader and Hobbs, 1999). There are three factors that can distort the 
incentive structure of the risk neutral firms:  
1.  Public Good Nature of Food Safety 
As discussed previously, food safety investments impose sizeable costs on the firms. 
Therefore in the process of supplying both meat and safety to the market the firms may not fully 
internalize the benefits from costly food safety activities due to the public good characteristics of 
safety. Without proper incentive mechanisms this would lead to under-provision of the public 
good (safety) in other words market failure.  This internalization problem underlies a departure 
from common interests between the principal and the risk-neutral agent.  
2.  Transaction Costs 
In their study of the U.S. meat industry using a cost function based on Antle’s model 
(2000), Ollinger and Mueller (2003) have pointed out a consistent negative relationship between 
output and the percent of deficient sanitation and process control practices (SPCPs). Their data 
corroborates the presence of diseconomies of scale in sanitation and process control efforts, in 
other words costs associated with these practices went up as the plant size increased. Moreover 
they suggest that 
“…large plants and those plants with a high percent- deficient SPCPs will be 
more likely to be in non-compliance with necessary HACCP tasks. Conversely, 
small plans with a low percent-deficient SPCPs will be less likely to be in 
noncompliance with HACCP-like or HACCP tasks” (p.51).
10 
                                                 
10 Ollinger and Mueller (2003) also indicate that these results were statistically weak. Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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Based on an ERS (2002) study on costs of food safety regulation, Ollinger and Ballinger 
(2003) report “Large plants had no special economic advantage in food safety process control” 
(p.5). Using transaction cost logic (see Williamson, 1985) the advantages from scale economies 
might be cancelled out by bureaucracy costs due to trying to manage complex and dynamic tasks 
within large and complex organizations. Therefore, whereas larger firms can leverage economies 
for the supply of meat, an economic “good;” agency relationships may not exist to efficiently 
incentivize a firm to reduce its supply of economic “bads; ” e.g poor safety.  
3.  Institutional Setting in the U.S. 
Larger firms are in a better position taking advantage of economies of scale to invest in 
food safety innovations (Golan et al., 2004a). However the main problem that impedes optimal 
food safety behavior in the U.S. meat firms is not the technological but the “institutional and 
philosophical” barriers (Golan et al., 2004b).   
 The U.S. institutional setting is predisposed to protect the fundamental rights of the 
individuals at the constitutional level (Lord Irvine of Lairg, 2000, 2001; Goldsmith, Gow and 
Turan, 2003; Turan, Goldsmith and Gow, 2004). Within this of constitutional setting the judicial 
branch is to guard these fundamental rights and courts are assigned a massive amount of power 
to regulate crucial societal matters (Aldisert, 1977; Priest, 1991; Rustad and Koenig, 2002).  
Meat safety can turn into a futile game for the regulatory system when food safety matters keep 
on reverting back to the courts. For example, a particular challenge is establishing cause, effect, 
responsibility, and punishment under the U.S. regulatory regime (Turan, Goldsmith and Gow, 
2004).   As a result firms may take advantage of the U.S. constitutional setting to constrain the 
agency relationship with the government as the principal by means of using the legal system to 
thwart the efforts of regulators.  Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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For example, in the Supreme Beef case, after repeated violations of the salmonella 
standard the USDA threatened to effectively shutdown the plant by removing inspectors. The 
Supreme Beef argued that the USDA violated the firm’s rights to conduct business (Maixner, 
2000). In December 2001, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided to uphold a lower court 
ruling that the salmonella performance standard exceeded USDA’s statutory authority (Lexis 
Nexis 26205; Law.com, The 5
th Circuit Court Opinion; Feedstuffs Washington Bureau, 2001). 
This was considered “a serious blow” to USDA’s regulatory authority (Glickman, 2002; Tucker 
Foremen, 2002).  
 
Conclusion 
Returning to Figure 2 and the model’s contract space, contracts involving risk neutral 
agents appear to be very problematic.  In the context of the U.S. meat system risk neutrality on 
the part of agents theoretically would assume that a fixed payment is efficient and that incentives 
are aligned between the principal and the agent.  But in application an efficient outcome will not 
occur because of the incentive distortions described above.  Therefore contrary to the traditional 
agency framework, the principal is challenged to incentivize a risk neutral agent.  This is difficult 
in both theory and practice and may explain in part why the U.S. regulatory system is not as 
effective as critics would like.  Analysis with our model would indicate that the underlying 
agency relationship is flawed and the government as principal is fundamentally challenged to 
incentivize the industry.   
An obvious question would arise then, if the underlying agency relationship is flawed and 
the impact of government as a principal is weak at best, how then is safety supplied?  Many, 
especially those in the industry, would suggest that the meat system is very safe.  If there is an Firms, Incentives, and the Supply of Food Safety: A Formal Model of Government Enforcement 
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abundant supply of safety, how then is that safety elicited if not from the government?  Though 
beyond the scope of this paper, but the subject of subsequent work by this research team, is 
research that explores the agency relationships between the legal system as principal and the 
industry as agent.  Also related is the study of private incentives such as insurance or brands as 
“principals.”  Either of them may be more effective explaining the source of safety in the US 
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i These costs can originate from different sources such as purchases and maintenance of new equipment, 
expanding facilities, changes in organizational structures or hiring and training employees (Siebert, Nayga Jr., and 
Hooker, 2000; Unnevehr and Jensen, 2001). Investments in food safety improvement therefore can influence 
profitability and competitive advantage in the market (Unnevehr and Jensen, 2001). 
Compliance and investments in food safety improvements can impose a heavier burden on smaller firms in 
the industry (MacDonald et al., 1996; Ollinger et al., 1997; Loader and Hobbs, 1999). For example there have been 
continuing concerns about the impacts of HACCP plan development and implementations on the smaller firms 
(Unnevehr and Jensen, 2001; Nganje and Mazzocco, 2000). After pointing out to the “large up-front investments” to 
build and implement a HACCP plan Unnevehr and Jensen (2001) explain the other reasons behind these concerns: 
[S]mall firms’ costs rise proportionally more than large firms’ with the implementation of 
HACCP, which may put them at a competitive disadvantage in the market. Furthermore, large 
firms frequently have more in-house resources at their disposal for design and implementation 
(e.g., meat scientists on staff, diagnostic labs) and therefore have lower transaction costs in 
implementing a HACCP plan. Some small firms might be expected to go out of business as a 
result of higher relative costs” (p.14). 
 
Economies of scale enables large firms not only to meet more complex market demands for products 
(Ollinger et al., 1997; MacDonald et al., 1996) but can also have a positive impact on the compliance rates (Loader 
and Hobbs, 1999; Siebert, Nayga Jr., and Hooker, 2000). 
Indeed, firms with an established position, and economies of scale in production, testing and 
marketing often see regulation as something that they are able to respond to with a greater degree 
of speed and precision than other firms. Small firms may often finds it difficult to respond quickly 
to complex and specific legislation (Loader and Hobbs, 1999, p.701).  
 
ii Fatigue may be thought of as either the natural depreciation of fixed assets or the natural decreasing sensitivity to 
stimuli by human assets, e.g. boredom, myopia, or repetitiveness.  A common example of fatigue in human systems 
is the decline in performance over time of baggage inspectors at airports.  Both have significant implications for 
principals and their elicitation of safety. 